Endless trench warfare is now Ukraine’s future and it’s West’s fault – Comment | Express Comment | Comment

Many commentators on the Russo-Ukraine war have expressed their disappointment over this summer and autumn’s Ukrainian counter-offensive.

Rather than breaking through the Russian defence lines and opening up into a war of manoeuvring armoured columns it rather seems to have stuttered to a halt.

Now Ukrainian Commander-in-Chief General Valerii Zaluzhnyi would appear to have confirmed this assessment, saying publicly that the war in Ukraine has become “positional” in nature. In an essay entitled « Modern Positional Warfare and How to Win It » and , Zaluzhnyi outlined the current operational environment in Ukraine and noted that, despite several previously successful Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in 2022, the war is now « gradually moving to a positional form. »

The main reason for a regression to a more static form of warfare was, he opined, largely a result of military parity between the UkraF and the RuAF, further noting that a decisive penetration of Russian defence lines will most likely not be possible with the current balance of forces.

Basically Zaluzhnyi acknowledged that technological and tactical parity between opposing forces in Ukraine has resulted in a « stalemate » similar to that in the First World War.

He then made a series of recommendations as to how Ukraine might break the deadlock and transition to a war of movement again.

According to Zaluzhnyi this will be dependent on Ukraine‘s ability to secure five main operational components that have become particularly significant since the summer of 2023.

First of these — and no surprises here – is gaining air superiority; as I have written oftentimes before, Ukraine has been attempting to do what no NATO country would contemplate, namely attacking a relatively sophisticated enemy without at least local air superiority.

Both sides’ air forces have been taken out of the equation by the extensive and layered anti-aircraft and missile systems that each possess. Whether the arrival of American-built F-16 fighter jets in Ukraine will shift the balance remains to be seen.

Then the UkrAF has to tackle the extraordinarily difficult problems of breaching Russian mine barriers in depth. Currently they have neither the in-depth training nor the appropriate specialised equipment in numbers to do so effectively. It’s a slow and dangerous process, and as the Ukrainians breach one line of defences the Russians just build another in its place further back.

Zaluzhnyi then said that Ukraine needed to increase the effectiveness of its counter-battery effort. In other words, it needs to become better at identifying and neutralising the Russian missile and artillery systems which are firing at them, an essential task for artillery in any army. Neutralising the enemy’s batteries means your own can be more profitably employed on other tasks.

Closely connected to this is the need to improve and build up the UkrAF electronic warfare (EW) capabilities. The term EW covers a multitude of sins, from intercepting and deciphering Russian electronic communications to jamming their radio nets and drone guidance systems. The latter task has taken on considerable prominence in the Russo-Ukraine war given the rapid evolution of drone warfare.

Finally, Zaluzhnyi emphasises the need to create and train the much needed reserves to supplement and allow rotation of troops at the front. Ukrainian units suffer from long stints in combat for lack of relieving units and many are constantly on the point of exhaustion. Plus battlefield attrition has taken a hefty toll of personnel; although Ukraine is understandably reluctant to publicise its casualties, we’re probably looking at well into six figures. There is an urgent requirement for trained additional man (and woman) power.

All of this constitutes a pretty honest and realistic assessment of where the UkrAF considers it stands at the moment. But stalemate doesn’t mean that the fighting has stopped, far from it.

Russian forces are currently involved in a series of highly attritional infantry-led ground assaults on Ukrainian positions in the Avdiivka area. Heavy indirect fire is being directed against Ukrainian frontline positions and near rear areas, and “Storm-Z” assault units made largely of convict recruits are being trained for future assaults.

As for the Ukrainians, their forces continue offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast. Plus there is that intriguing information that they have established and are managing to maintain a foothold on the left (eastern) ban of the Dnipro river near Kherson City which could develop into something significant in due course.

So it may appear that the Ukrainian battlefields have ground to a halt, but for those in the front lines it’s very much business as usual. When the ground freezes over this winter we may see a modicum of movement return.

Lt Col Stuart Crawford is a defence analyst and former army officer. Sign up for his podcasts and newsletters at www.DefenceReview.uk